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Hashim: The World according to Usama Bin Laden

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO USAMA BIN LADEN
Ahmed S. Hashim

S

ince 11 September 2001, a day etched in the memories of all Americans,
Usama Bin Laden has replaced Saddam Hussein as Public Enemy Number
One. This is hardly surprising, given the growing consensus that the Saudi fugitive
and his shadowy Al-Qaeda network were responsible for the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil, the single deadliest act of terrorism anywhere to date.
For over a decade Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had been perceived as a “new Hitler,” a totalitarian thug with nasty weapons and an age-old quest for personal
and national aggrandizement. Americans felt they understood his agenda of
territorial irredentism and greed. Moreover, while he “talked the talk,” he could
not “walk the walk.” His threat to unleash the “mother of all battles” with his
vaunted army turned into the “mother of all embarrassments,” the humiliating
defeat of that army in February 1991.
Bin Laden, on the other hand, is terrifyingly different for most Americans.
Perhaps many were vaguely familiar with him as a result of the bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, and the
attack on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden Harbor in 2000, all of which he is suspected of masterminding. Now, as a result of terror attacks by which he “reached
out and touched” the homeland, Bin Laden is known,
Dr. Hashim is associate professor of strategic studies in
at least by name, to every American.
the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War
College. He specializes in Southwest Asian strategic isThe attacks were carried out against the symbols of
sues, on which he has written extensively. He received
American economic and military power, the World
his B.A. from Warwick University, in the United KingTrade Center and the Pentagon. There are indications
dom, and his master’s and doctoral degrees from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Cambridge,
that the White House, the symbol of American politiMassachusetts.
cal power, was also a target. The attacks of 11 SeptemNaval War College Review, Autumn 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 4
ber 2001 constituted not only a political, economic,
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and psychological blow but also a cultural shock to Americans. Bin Laden’s ideas
and visions are unfamiliar to most Americans, who find the idea of a holy war in
this day and age bizarre. Questions abound: “Why do they hate us?” “What does
he want?” Indeed, Bin Laden’s goals remain the least understood aspect of this
crisis.
His methods were unfamiliar to most Americans, who have indeed suffered from
acts of terror committed against them and their country’s interests, but overseas.
Large-scale terror attacks at home have been rare. The conspiracy to bring down
the World Trade Center towers in 1993 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
building in Oklahoma City in 1995 were significant acts of terror, but they pale
by comparison with the events of 11 September 2001. The latter attacks were diabolically brilliant in conception and execution. The perpetrators did not use
“normal” weapons of war—they attacked the United States not with intercontinental ballistic missiles but with commercial aircraft used as guided missiles—and the result was the deaths of thousands of innocent people. If this was
not terrorism, what is?
We can eschew a long and ultimately futile discussion of the definition of
1
terrorism. Much ink has been spilled on this topic. The definition used by the
U.S. government (and analyzed in detail by Paul Pillar) is sufficient for the purposes of this paper: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usu2
ally intended to influence an audience.”
The 11 September perpetrators were not ten-foot-tall “supermen” but “ordinary,” in some cases well educated, men who planned their mission well but who
3
also made many mistakes prior to the commission of their act. Moreover, the
hijackers were not armed with the latest in sophisticated gadgetry but with box
cutters and knives. Nonetheless, and most important, they were willing to lay
down their lives. They were of a breed of men that one Israeli terrorism expert
4
has called “Islamikaze.” But they are not a new phenomenon, their kind having
appeared in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Suicide attacks have plagued Israel since
the mid-1990s and have caused a considerable number of casualties during the
cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians that erupted in October 2000.
However, apart from events like the assault on the U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut in 1983 (a bombing that killed 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers) and the
suicide attack on the USS Cole by two men in a speedboat, the last time Americans had come face to face with this culturally different form of warfare was in
the Pacific War against the Japanese. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001
spawned a vast “instant” literature seeking to answer a large number of disparate
questions. What do these terror attacks on the continental United States mean
for homeland defense and national missile defense? Who is Usama Bin Laden?
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How were the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon planned?
How does the shadowy Al-Qaeda network function?
There has been very little writing, however, that deals with Bin Laden’s
thought and the rationale for the Al-Qaeda. Raymond Tanter describes Bin
Laden as a freelancer who is completely independent of states yet operates
within a state and may collaborate with rogue regimes. However, Tanter offers
5
little about the man and his ideas. Yossef Bodansky has produced a vast com6
pendium of myths, facts, and half-truths, all lacking documentation. Mary
Anne Weaver presents a biographical summary of Bin Laden’s life but no detailed analysis of his philosophy.7
Major studies of Bin Laden are reported to be on the way, but in the meantime, a short piece by Michael Dobbs in the Washington Post and a presentation
8
by Dr. Bard O’Neill on Bin Laden’s view of the world warrant mention. By far
the most detailed and complex analysis of the religious background of Bin
9
Laden’s thought is a study by Rosalind Gwynne.
What, then, is Bin Laden’s philosophy, with its origins, message, and goals—in
other words, his worldview? In times of crisis, tragedy, or war, human beings
tend to view things in Manichean terms—as a struggle between the good and the
bad, viewed as equally powerful—and to portray an antagonist as unmitigatedly
evil. However, the best way ultimately to defeat one’s enemies is to understand
them.
Our quest for understanding relies on a three-level methodological framework. First, in order to understand Bin Laden’s conception of world order, two
interrelated analytical steps are necessary. We need to understand the political,
cultural, and social milieu, or context, within which Bin Laden arose—some of
the political ideas of the Islamists who influenced him.
The context of the Arab world in particular, and the Islamic world in general,
is one of turmoil as a result of the declining political legitimacy of rulers and of
massive socioeconomic and identity crises. Relatedly, we need to understand
that Bin Laden is not among the foremost Islamists; nor are his
ideas particularly original. Over the past two decades, Islamists
have sought to explain the causes of the political, socioeconomic, and identity-related crises of their own societies and of
the Islamic world and to provide solutions to them. Bin Laden
drew many of his ideas from such Islamists, in particular the
Egyptian Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag, who was executed
in 1982 for his role in the assassination of President Anwar
Al-Sadat. Farag himself was not an original thinker; indeed,
more famous scholars offer a deeper understanding of the
philosophical wellsprings of Islamic fundamentalism. Farag
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is important because he wrote a manifesto of action for the Islamic
fundamentalists.
Second, we need to address Bin Laden’s own ideas, by tracing his evolution
from the unremarkable scion of a wealthy family into an Islamist in 1979 and
then proceeding to a careful textual analysis of some interviews over the last
several years. It will be necessary to keep in mind, however, that Bin Laden is a
man more of action than of words.
Third, what does it all mean? What is Bin Laden trying to achieve in the larger
scheme of things? Does his war against the United States, and by extension the
rest of the West, portend a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Is10
lamic world? He may see it in such terms, but does this mean that the West
should? If in fact the West succumbs to the siren song of those who would welcome such a clash, the implications will be far-reaching and ominous.
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
The context from which Usama Bin Laden emerged was that of the Arab world.
Bin Laden, after all, is an Arab from Saudi Arabia, even though he later based
himself in non-Arab Afghanistan. In this context, it is instructive to begin with
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 following its defeat in World War I.
The Arabic-speaking peoples who had been a part of this Turkish-ruled multiethnic empire sought to found an independent Arab state, or states. In a remarkable study, the noted Arab-American scholar Fouad Ajami borrowed from T. E.
Lawrence the phrase “dream palace” to describe the intellectual edifice of secular
nationalism and modernity that the Arabs constructed and thought would constitute the theoretical underpinnings of their entry into the modern world.11
The “Catastrophe”
The imposition following World War I of European colonialism, particularly in
its British and French variants, did not dim Arab optimism concerning the
future. Indeed, the adherence of many Arab thinkers to imported European notions of secular nationalism and modernity led them to object to colonialism
specifically because of the resulting underdevelopment and the lack of legitimacy of puppet regimes. Some Arab thinkers and politicians in the interwar
years turned their backs on secular, liberal nationalism, because of its association with Britain and France, and espoused radical nationalist tendencies and
far-right ideologies that looked on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy with sympathy. Ultimately, though, Arabs saw their salvation in ideas brought from the
West. Very few subscribed to the view that a return to the precepts of Islam constituted a solution to the subjugation of the Arab world to colonialism and to
its lack of development.
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Even in the 1950s and 1960s, when independence came and the elites of the
colonial regimes were overthrown by supposedly forward-looking modernizers,
many Arab thinkers and some rulers continued to believe that the modernization of their societies lay in the
What, then, is Bin Laden’s philosophy, with its implementation of a nationalist
and socialist agenda. Modern soorigins, message, and goals—in other words,
cieties, dynamic economies, and
his worldview?
powerful armies were the visible
outcomes desired by the post–World War II “enlightened” dictators who
emerged in many Arab countries. They did not achieve those outcomes. The humiliating Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967 became, in the view of Fouad
Ajami, the Waterloo of Arab secular nationalism. This defeat was known in
Arabic as al nakba, the catastrophe, a term denoting something deeper than a
mere battlefield reverse. Indeed, the defeat was a sad commentary on the entire
Arab world, but particularly on the modernizing regimes, which had been
shown to be corrupt, tin-pot dictatorships. Their economies were a mess; they
had not created a new “socialist man,” with progressive ideas; certainly, they had
not built powerful armies.
Not surprisingly, no sooner had the Arab militaries been defeated than a
whole generation of intellectuals and politicians sought to analyze the causes.
The secularists argued that the Arab states had been defeated by a modern and
advanced power, that the Arabs had lost because they had failed to modernize effectively and thoroughly. Their solution was to deepen the quest for modernity.
Others were more conservative, arguing that the solution was a blending of Arab
and Islamic culture with the best that the Western world had to offer in the way
12
of technology.
The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism
However, it was the views of a group of thinkers who came to be known as “Islamic fundamentalists” that became most prominent. Islamic fundamentalism
is not a new phenomenon, but it has gained strength whenever great stress has
13
been placed on Arab or other Muslim societies. The 1967 defeat constituted
such a period in Arab history. Some Islamic fundamentalists argued that Israel
had won the 1967 war because its people had remained true to their faith,
whereas the Arab world had lost because its rulers and people had turned away
from their own faith, Islam. Others took the point farther, arguing forcefully
that the Arab world needed to turn its back on imported and alien ideologies
and return to Islam. They dismissed Western approaches, such as the idea and
14
practice of the secular nation-state, as hulul mustawrada, “imported solutions.”
The continued failures of all Arab regimes following the defeat of 1967 provided
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more ammunition to the Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, The Economist put
it concisely and accurately not long after the 11 September 2001 attack:
The past three decades have provided fertile ground for these ideas [Islamic fundamentalism]. Nearly every Muslim country has experienced the kind of social stress
that generates severe doubt, discontent and despair. Populations have exploded.
Cities, once the abode of the privileged, have been overrun by impoverished, discontented provincials. The authoritarian nature of many postcolonial governments,
the frequent failure of their great plans, and their continued dependence on western
money, arms and science have discredited their brand of secularism. The intrusion of
increasingly liberal western ways, brought by radio, films, television, the Internet and
tourism, has engendered schism by seducing some and alienating others.16

To sum up, the nation-states of the Arab world, and of the Islamic world in
general, have failed to meet the triple challenge of modernity, economic development, and political legitimacy. Islamic fundamentalists point to this failure as
grounds for opposition to imported solutions and for acceptance of their own
concept—the nizam Islami, the Islamic order. Before discussing what some
Islamists mean by “Islamic order” and their various strategies for bringing it
about, a few words about Islam itself are necessary.
The Islamic Divine Order. Unlike Christianity, Islam is both a religion and a
sociopolitical system. There is no separation between church and state, between
God and Caesar. The Prophet Muhammad was both a religious figure, who received the Koran as a revelation from God, and a political ruler, who conducted
affairs of state, engaged in diplomatic interactions with his neighbors, and
fought wars against his enemies. There was in Islam no Reformation like that
which Christianity underwent in the sixteenth century; in fact, the very notion is
theoretically alien to the Islamic community, or Umma—“theoretically,” because for most of the history of Islam, Muslims have not really lived under an Islamic order. The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the vast majority of Arabs and
Muslim peoples for close to five hundred years, could be conceived of as an Islamic order only by stretching the notion; the sultans in Istanbul were often corrupt and dissolute men who came to power by illegitimate means and were
ultimately incapable of protecting the Islamic community from the depredations of foreign powers.
Modern rulers in the Arab and Muslim worlds have fared no better; their litany of failures and defeats has been long and sorrowful. The Islamic fundamentalists’ own vision of rule calls for the implementation of hakimiyat Allah, God’s
rule, under which the divine law, the Sharia, would hold sway. An Islamic divine
order is one that is characterized by the sovereignty of God alone. The head of
such an Islamic state exercises power legitimately only insofar as he carries out
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the will of God—that is to say, the injunctions of the Sharia. This Islamic divine
order stands in stark contrast to constructs created by Western man and imported into the Islamic societies.
The Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967 Man-made political orders, such
was known in Arabic as al nakba, the catastro- as secular-liberal or Marxist polities, assert that sovereignty belongs
phe; it was a sad commentary on the Arab
to man. This, in the Islamic divine
modernizing regimes.
order, is blasphemy—God alone
is sovereign. Muslims who live under man-made political orders exist in a modern jahiliyyah, originally a Koranic term describing the state of ignorance and
barbarism that prevailed in Arabia before the revelations to the Prophet Muhammad.17 In the modern context, jahiliyyah refers to societies that are antithetical to Islamic order.
If Islamic order is the solution, how is it brought about? As Lenin asked, chto
18
delat’? What is to be done? Taken to their logical conclusion, the political views
of many Islamic fundamentalists inevitably imply violent confrontation with
the state. But the reality of power relationships, to paraphrase Samuel Johnson,
concentrates the mind wonderfully. Fighting the Arab state poses major problems. Notwithstanding its decay and corruption, the Arab nation-state has a
formidable apparatus, in the shape of large security services and paramilitary
forces. In fact, one could argue convincingly that one of the few successes of the
modern Arab state—its ability to survive in spite of its multitude of problems—has
been due simply to its efficient, multilayered, and well funded security apparatus. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s Islamic fundamentalists launched bloody
19
armed struggles against the secular states of Algeria and Egypt. Neither has yet
collapsed. They have been weakened and their legitimacy further battered, but
the Arab state, as represented by those two countries as well as by Syria and
Iraq—both of which have faced their own Islamic radicals—has been as ruthless
as its opponents.
Not surprisingly, given this disparity in power, some Islamic fundamentalists
have focused their attention on the individual within society, or on the society
itself; this approach, a form of Basil Liddell Hart’s strategy of the “indirect approach,” avoids head-on confrontation with the state and seeks to re-Islamize
individuals in their daily lives, in the hope that they will break radically with the
manners and customs of “impious” society. Others have adopted a broader and
more peaceful approach that seeks to re-Islamize society as a whole by propagating Islamic cultural values throughout such institutions as the media, the judiciary, entertainment, etc. The commanding heights of the state, so to speak, are left
alone, because any assault on the political leadership, public institutions, or armed
forces elicits a vigorous and vicious response. Of course, both indirect strategies
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ultimately undermine secular foundations of the nation-state; neither is easy to
20
combat, as the secular Turkish state has discovered over the last decade.
The Neglected Duty. Some extremist Islamic fundamentalists continue to preach the
necessity and virtue of direct action, of armed struggle. To legitimize and promote
such a proactive approach in the face of the pitfalls and dangers, one needs a justification. That justification has appeared in a little-known manifesto, Al-Faridah
Al-Gha’ibah (the neglected duty), by Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag. The work
of this Egyptian Islamic radical, who was a member of Al-Jihad, is critical to understanding Usama Bin Laden’s conception of world order and his choice of direct
21
confrontation.
Farag begins his manifesto by asking, “Do we live in an Islamic state?” A Muslim lives in an Islamic polity if its rulers follow the Islamic law. If not, Muslims
are said to be in the dar al Kufr, abode of infidels. Rebellion against such a system
is permissible. Farag quotes the Prophet Muhammad: “If you have proof of infi22
delity [you] must fight it.” He dismisses all the possible peaceful ways that have
23
been put forward for the establishment of an Islamic polity. The only way, says
Farag, is jihad, which is imperative against oppressive and iniquitous rulers.
The meaning of jihad has been a cause of considerable controversy among
Western scholars of Islam and its popular interpreters. It has erroneously been
24
25
taken to mean “holy war.” The phrase meaning “holy war” is harb mukaddasah;
jihad conveys striving or exertion (that is, fighting) in the way of God—against
the evil in oneself, against Satan, against apostates (murtadd) within one’s society, or against infidels. For Farag, the most important jihad is the third one. It is
so important that jihad, says Farag, should be the sixth pillar of the Islamic
faith (see the table). This is a striking innovation, since Islam’s five pillars of
faith—individual and social obligations—were prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad in a hadith, or saying.
Farag argues that the Islamists must focus first on the enemy at home: “We
must begin . . . by establishing the rule of God in our nation. . . . [T]he first battlefield for jihad is the uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them with
an Islamic system from which we can build.”26 Only afterward can the enemy
“who is afar” (in Farag’s words) be combatted. Usama Bin Laden seems to have
reversed the order somewhat, in that he has conPILLARS OF ISLAM
centrated primarily on the enemy who is technically afar, the United States, rather than on the
Shahada
profession of faith
impious rulers of Islamic states. But the situaSalat
prayers
tion by the 1990s was far different from when
Qakat
almsgiving or charity
Farag was executed in 1982. In the 1990s the
Sawm
fasting
United States established a visible and looming
Hajj
pilgrimage
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presence in the Arabian Peninsula—the “land of the two holy mosques,” in Bin
Laden’s language. In this context, Bin Laden, who focuses his ire on the United
States as the support of its “puppets,” the Al-Sauds, sees the enemy at home and
the enemy who is afar as intricately linked in a symbiotic relationship.
Finally, jihad, says Farag, allows all kinds of operational tactics. Deceiving and
lying to the enemy is permissible, as it allows “victory with the fewest losses and
27
by the easiest means possible.” Similarly, infiltrating the infidels’ ranks and ap28
pearing to be one of them is also permissible. Farag also mentions the importance of detailed planning before the battle is joined.
Farag’s exposition of jihad influenced many within the present circles of
Islamic revolutionary action; one of these was Usama Bin Laden. Bin Laden may
have read Farag on his own; it is more likely that Farag’s ideas were passed on
to him by his second in charge, the fugitive Egyptian surgeon Dr. Ayman
29
al-Zawahiri.
THE EVOLUTION OF A TERRORIST
Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden was born in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in
1957. He was the seventeenth of fifty-two children, and the seventh son sired by
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Laden, who had come to Saudi Arabia in 1930 from the
Hadramaut region of Yemen.30 Muhammad Bin Laden came into Saudi Arabia a
destitute man; he would die in 1968 (in an airplane crash) a billionaire. Over the
decades he established his family as the wealthiest in the construction industry
in Saudi Arabia, with strong financial ties and bonds of friendship to the royal
family. Nothing in his son’s early years indicated that Usama, born into wealth
and privilege, was destined to achieve notoriety on the world stage.
The Transformation of 1979
Bin Laden’s father was dominating and domineering, and he imposed discipline
and a strict social and religious code on all his children. Some accounts say Bin
Laden was quite religious, living in a city, Jeddah, that was exposed to the
thought of many Islamic scholars. Others argue that Bin Laden was not at all
religious and had imbibed liberal ideas from his Syrian mother, a progressive
woman who was his father’s fourth wife. Bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz
University in Jeddah and in 1979 earned a degree—in economics and management, by some accounts, or in civil engineering, by others. It is difficult to get a
clear-cut picture of Bin Laden’s early years. Unlike many other committed fundamentalists, Bin Laden never lived or studied in the West. However, he is an
educated man, like many others who succumbed to radical politics through
distaste for, and frustration with, the conditions prevailing in their societies.
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We should judge the year 1979 as transformative in Bin Laden’s life. In that
year three major events shook the Middle East. On 26 March, Egypt and Israel
made peace, a peace that was denounced by Arabs and Muslims the world over as
a sellout. Two months earlier, an Iranian revolution led by an ascetic cleric, the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, toppled the shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi,
the most powerful ruler in the
Are we witnessing the clash of civilizations, or Middle East and the most important pillar of U.S. security and
is the struggle against Bin Laden primarily a
military and law-enforcement campaign? Both economic interests in the Persian
Gulf. Finally, in December, the Soare losing strategies.
viets invaded Afghanistan, a Muslim country with an unstable Marxist puppet government aligned with the
Soviet Union. We do not know whether the first two events, momentous as they
were, had much impact on Bin Laden; the last event definitely did. In one of his
earliest interviews Bin Laden recalled, “When the invasion of Afghanistan started,
I was enraged and went there at once. I arrived within days, before the end of
31
1979.”
Bin Laden may have been exaggerating the alacrity with which he traveled to
Afghanistan, but the Soviet invasion was certainly important for him, in two
major ways. First, it was an act by an external enemy, an infidel and godless
enemy, against an Islamic country. This led Bin Laden to focus his wrath on the
enemy outside of Islam rather than on the internal oppressive ruler. Second, the
jihad in Afghanistan brought Bin Laden face to face with the military and
technological strength of a superpower. He was impressed in some ways, yet disdainful in others. He and the contingent of Muslim volunteers from Arab countries—on which more below—fought the Soviets to a standstill in a couple of
32
battles. Bin Laden thought that the Soviets were admirably ruthless but also
paper tigers: “The myth of the super power was destroyed not only in my mind
33
but also in the minds of all Muslims. Slumber and fatigue vanished.”
Bin Laden’s Political Philosophy and Strategy of Direct Action
The evolution of Bin Laden’s political philosophy will be examined from the
early 1990s to the present, through a textual analysis of his interviews, his fatwas
(rulings), and his “epistles,” or edicts. All of these point to his tactics and conceptions of world order, from the struggle in Afghanistan to his current struggle
against the United States.
The Afghanistan War and Exile. Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, Bin Laden began to develop his conception of who the outside enemy was, a view that he articulated to a French journalist in 1995—it was the communists and the West. “I
did not fight against the communist threat while forgetting the peril from the
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West. . . . I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we
had to fight on all fronts against communist or Western oppression. The urgent
thing was communism but the next target was America. . . . This is an open war
34
up to the end, until victory.”
In Bin Laden’s eyes, he and the Afghan guerrillas were aligned at the time with
the Americans solely because they were fighting a common enemy. It is not clear
what relationship he had, if any, with the Central Intelligence Agency, which was
pouring money and arms into Afghanistan. Whatever the case, Bin
Fundamentalists point to the failure of Arab
nation-states as grounds for opposition to im- Laden regarded America as an enemy; if he did accept funds and
ported solutions and for acceptance of their
weapons, it simply indicated his
own concept—the Islamic order.
willingness to collaborate operationally with one ideological enemy in order to go after another. (In this connection, it would be useful to know whether he has since accepted support from
regional states with which he and his network have little ideological affinity.)
Second, the war in Afghanistan showed Bin Laden’s modus operandi, political and organizational skills, flexibility, and opportunism. Contrary to popular
belief, he did not rush into Afghanistan, AK-47 in hand, to battle the Soviets
personally. The jihad was not only a matter of fighting, dying, and killing in the
name of God. It required extensive preparation, a logistical infrastructure, political support for the Afghan fighters, funds, and the recruitment of Muslim volunteers from other parts of the Islamic world. Bin Laden did not participate in
major battles at this stage. Between 1979 and 1982, in fact, he was in Afghanistan
for only short periods. He made several trips out to collect money and matériel
for the guerrillas. In late 1982 he took back construction and earth-moving machinery; an Iraqi engineer friend used it to dig massive tunnels and caves into the
mountains in Bakhhar Province for hospitals and weapons depots.
In 1984 he formalized his role in the Afghan conflict, establishing a guesthouse
in Peshawar for Muslim volunteers on their way to the war, and cofounding
(with the well-known Palestinian Islamist ’Abdullah Azzam) the Maktab al
Khidamat, or Jihad Service Bureau. The bureau was a propaganda and charity
organization whose publications ultimately attracted thousands of Arabs and
other Muslims to fight in the war.
By 1984 these volunteers were arriving in significant numbers. At the height
of the conflict the “Afghan Arabs” included fifteen thousand from Saudi Arabia,
five thousand from Yemen, three to five thousand from Egypt, two thousand
from Algeria, a thousand from the Arab states of the Gulf, a thousand more
from Libya, and several hundred from Iraq. Apparently Bin Laden played a cru35
cial role in facilitating the entry into Afghanistan of these willing recruits. He
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commanded some of the Afghan Arabs, and in 1986 he decided to enter the battle actively against the Soviet forces. Among the fighters under his command
were former senior military officers from Egypt and Syria, with combat experi36
ence and with training in the Soviet Union.
Bin Laden continued to pay attention to preparations and infrastructure. He
cultivated people in high places to fill the coffers for the war effort against the
Soviets. One of Bin Laden’s most
productive years was 1988, when
Bin Laden’s ideas and visions are unfamiliar
to most Americans, who find the idea of a holy he realized that he needed better
documentation of the activities of
war in this day and age bizarre.
the Afghan Arabs. A formalized
structure was essential to keep track of the comings and goings of the foreign
fighters and to list their wounded and dead. For this he set up Al-Qaeda, mean37
ing simply “the base.” In due course Al-Qaeda developed into a large clearing38
house for a host of loosely aligned radical Islamic organizations.
Thus, in a nutshell, if Bin Laden entered Afghanistan as a dilettante, he left as
a committed believer. Apart from articulation of his views of the enemy and his
recognition that the enemy was not invulnerable, he set down little in the way of
political philosophy or worldview. In 1989 the Soviets acknowledged defeat and
withdrew from Afghanistan. It was clear to most people by then that the Soviet
Union was a superpower in terminal decline. Bin Laden believed that the Afghan
Arabs had contributed in no small measure to its collapse.
Interestingly, when Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 he began to
focus his attention on an enemy that was close at hand—not the Saudi regime
but Saddam Hussein of Iraq. In 1989 Bin Laden began to warn of impending
Iraqi aggression against the kingdom. He saw Saddam Hussein as a greedy and
aggressive secular Arab nationalist, an anti-Islamic ruler who could threaten two
holy places, Mecca and Medina. In August of 1990—perhaps another milestone
year for Bin Laden—Iraq invaded Kuwait. In Bin Laden’s eyes, one of the key duties of an Islamic ruler is to defend his territory from aggression. He suggested
that Saudi Arabia augment its defenses, on which the rulers had spent so lavishly,
with thousands of former Afghan Arabs.
To the consternation of Bin Laden, the royal family decided instead to invite
the Americans, infidels, to defend the holy places. In 1998, in his declaration of
the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” (discussed
below), there was clear evidence of Bin Laden’s dismay, expressed in masterful
Arabic imagery:
Since God laid down the Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it
with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have
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spread in it like locusts, crowding its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure;
and this at a time when the nations contend against the Muslims like diners jostling
around a bowl of food.39

What he saw as an American invasion led Bin Laden in 1995 to articulate his
first major critique of the Saudi regime, in an “Open Letter to King Fahd.” In it
Bin Laden took the royal family to task for lack of commitment to Islam, squandering of public funds and oil money, inability to implement a viable defense
policy, and dependence on non-Muslims for protection. This came very close to
denying the political legitimacy of the Al-Sauds. In his communiqué Bin Laden
advocated a campaign of small-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the kingdom. The
royal family stripped him of his nationality and sent him into exile, first to
Sudan and ultimately back to Afghanistan. Not long after his falling-out with the
Saudi royal family, attacks were conducted against U.S. facilities in Dhahran
(1995) and at Khobar (1996). Bin Laden did not claim “credit” for these attacks
but, in what was to become a trademark following attacks in which he was implicated, applauded the perpetrators: “What happened . . . when 24 Americans
were killed in two bombings is clear evidence of the huge anger of Saudi people
40
against America. The Saudis now know their real enemy is America.”
“Declaration of War against the Americans.” The philosophical underpinnings
of Bin Laden’s opposition to America are to be found in two key epistles. The
first is the “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the
41
Two Holy Places,” issued on 23 August 1996. We must understand the regional
and global context in which what is being called the “Ladenese Epistle” first circulated. Muslims, says Bin Laden, from Palestine to Iraq, from Chechnya to
Bosnia, have been slaughtered in large numbers, their lands expropriated, and
their wealth looted, by non-Muslims:
The people of Islam [have] suffered from aggression, iniquity, and injustice imposed
on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators, to the extent that
the Muslims’ blood became the cheapest and their wealth was loot in the hands of
enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the
massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in
[Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina] took place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake
the conscience.42

What, one may ask, has all this to do with America? These events were unfortunate, but America cannot be blamed for them. Not so, Bin Laden—and many
others in the region, even some who do not share his vision—would respond.
America, they would say, provided some of the arms used in massacres of Muslims; for example, the killing of hundreds of Lebanese civilians in Qana in 1996
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in the wake of the Israeli Operation GRAPES OF WRATH involved American
weapons. In the Yugoslav civil war, America stood passively by, mouthing platitudes about human rights, as Muslim civilians were massacred. America does
nothing while Russians slaughter Chechens yearning to be free of Moscow’s
yoke. Further, they would reply, America says nothing about the depredations of
the Arab and Muslim rulers against their own peoples.
However, the focus of Bin Laden’s anger in the 1996 epistle was the continued
American “occupation” of the land of the holy places, a presence that the corrupt
Al-Sauds had permitted at a time when their country suffered from economic
distress and demoralization. Several attempts by well-meaning citizens to draw
the attention of the Al-Sauds to the terrible state of the country had been to no
avail. Why?
Everyone [has] agreed that the situation cannot be rectified . . . unless the root of the
problem is tackled. Hence it is essential to hit the main enemy who divided the
Umma into small and little countries and pushed it, for the last few decades, into a
state of confusion. The Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to contain and abort
any “corrective movement” appearing in the Islamic countries.43

In this regard, one of the most important duties of Muslims is “pushing the
Americans out of the holy land.” To lend weight to his argument Bin Laden
quotes a noted Islamic jurist of medieval times, Ibn Taymiyyah, who argued that
when Muslims face a serious threat, they must ignore minor differences and collaborate to get the enemy out of the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam). As Bin Laden
put it, “If there [is] more than one duty to be carried out, then the most important one should receive priority. Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more
important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. . . . The
ill effect of ignoring these [minor] differences, at a given period of time, is much
less than the ill effect of the occupation of the Muslims’ land by the great Kufr
44
[unbelief].” If the Muslims fight one another instead of the great Kufr, they will
incur casualties, exhaust their own economic and financial resources, destroy
their infrastructures and oil industries, and expose themselves to even greater
control by the Zionist-Crusader alliance.
Also in this epistle Bin Laden articulates his disdain for the United States. After the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia, William Perry, the secretary of defense at the time, declared (Bin Laden says) that the explosions had
“taught him one lesson: that is, not to withdraw when attacked by coward terrorists.” Bin Laden’s response in his 1996 epistle is an interesting look into his
mind-set:
We say to the Defense Secretary that his talk can induce a grieving mother to
laughter! . . . Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took
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place in 1983? . . . You [were] turned into scattered pits and pieces at that time; 241
mainly marine soldiers were killed. And where was this courage of yours when two
explosions made you leave Aden in less than twenty-four hours! But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where—after vigorous propaganda about the power of
the USA and its post–Cold War leadership of the new world order—you moved tens
of thousands of an international force, including twenty-eight thousand American
soldiers, into Somalia. However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area
carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. . . . You have
been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew. The extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear.45

Bin Laden, then, views the United States as a paper tiger, like the Soviet
Union—which, however, he considers a more worthy opponent, because it
fought hard and ruthlessly in Afghanistan. However, Bin Laden may be making a mistake here. Americans are often blinded by what the British strategic analyst Ken Booth once called “strategic ethnocentrism,” inability to perceive other
cultures or societies in an empathetic manner, or to understand them. Bin Laden
may suffer from the same disease vis-à-vis the United States. He may have underestimated the nation’s resilience and ingenuity; he may believe that after the
Somalia experience it would always respond in a lumbering, technological manner and do no more than launch a few cruise missiles. These assumptions may be
among the first cracks that can be exploited in the edifice of his conception of
the world.
Nonetheless, Bin Laden does not underestimate the difficulty of fighting the
United States. Islamic fundamentalists elsewhere—such as Sheikh Hussain Fadlallah
of the Lebanese organization Hizballah—have had to deal with an imbalance of
power between their groups and their enemy, Israel. For his part, Bin Laden is
quite aware of the technological superiority of the United States:
Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between
our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be
adopted—that is, using fast-moving light forces that work under complete secrecy.
In other words to initiate a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the
military forces, take part in it. And as you know, it is wise, in the present circumstances, for the armed military forces not to be engaged in a conventional fight with
the forces of the crusader enemy.46

Nowhere in the 1996 epistle did Bin Laden refer to the type of operation that
was to occur on 11 September 2001 (though, of course, that does not preclude
its possibility). He focused on the creation of the kinds of assets needed to attack
forward-positioned U.S. forces, such as those in Saudi Arabia. How does one redress an imbalance of power? Bin Laden mentions a number of ideas in his
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“Declaration of War,” such as boycotting American goods. More interesting is
his belief, expressed elsewhere in 1998, that it would be permissible for him to
acquire weapons of mass destruction: “Acquiring weapons for the defense of
Muslims is a religious duty. If I
Bin Laden thought that the Soviets were admi- have indeed acquired these weaprably ruthless but also paper tigers.
ons, then I thank God for enabling
me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not
to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting
47
harm on Muslims.”
It seems also that the strategy of using “fast-moving light forces” includes the
48
salutary application of terror. In another part of the epistle Bin Laden says that
terrorism against American forces is legitimate: “Terrorizing you, while you are
carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. . . . [Y]our
example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and
got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms,
49
freely on his land and provides you with peace and security.”
The italicized passage is important, as it highlights an essential difference between Bin Laden’s conception of terrorism and that of Americans: he considers
the killing of unarmed U.S. personnel in their offices or barracks legitimate;
the American view is that the indiscriminate killing of unarmed personnel is
clear-cut terrorism and illegitimate.
The 1996 epistle ended on this intriguing note. However, later that year, in the
October–November 1996 issue of an Islamic magazine, Nida’ ul Islam, Bin
Laden dismissed the notion that his declaration of war against the United States
presence in the holy land was terrorism. Instead, he argued, it was what America
and its ally Israel were doing to the Muslim peoples that constituted terrorism:
The evidence overwhelmingly shows America and Israel killing the weaker men,
women and children in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A few examples of this are
seen in the recent Qana massacre in Lebanon, and the death of more than 600,000
Iraqi children because of the shortage of food and medicine which resulted from the
boycotts and sanctions against the Muslim Iraqi people. . . . Not to forget the dropping of the atom bombs on cities with their entire populations of children, elderly
and women, on purpose and in a premeditated manner, as was the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.50

In his “Declaration of War against the United States” Bin Laden did not target
American civilians, only U.S. military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia.
However, that was to change dramatically.
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“Declaration of the World Islamic Front.” On 22 February 1998, an edict over
Bin Laden’s signature was published in the Arabic-language paper Al-Quds
al-Arabi; it was entitled the “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and the Crusaders.” It was a more significant document than the
“Ladenese Epistle.” It articulated more fully why Bin Laden views the United
51
States as an enemy and how he proposed to deal with that enemy.
In the 1998 epistle he offered three major reasons why America is to be considered an enemy of the Islamic peoples:
First—For more than seven years the United States [has been] occupying the lands of
Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its
rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the
peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples. . . .
Second—Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands
of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of dead, exceeding a million, the Americans nevertheless, in spite of all this, are trying once more to
repeat this dreadful slaughter. . . . They come again today to destroy what remains of
this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.
Third—While the purposes of the Americans in these wars are religious and economic, they also serve the petty state of the Jews, to direct attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and the killing of Muslims in it.
There is no better proof of all this than their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest
of the neighboring Arab states, and their attempt to dismember all the states of the
region, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Sudan, into petty states, whose
division and weakness would ensure the survival of Israel and the continuation of the
calamitous Crusader occupation of the lands of Arabia.52

These three crimes constituted “a clear declaration of war by the Americans
against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims.” When the Muslim world goes on the
offensive, war is conducted by professional soldiers and even volunteers; however, when it is under attack, the defense of the community becomes the duty of
every individual Muslim. The Islamic umma, the declaration held, was now
fighting a defensive war against the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance;
therefore, as the ulema (the authorities on theology and Islamic law) had uniformly ruled for many centuries, jihad was the duty of every Muslim. This is an
interesting and subtle distinction; because of it, Bin Laden can claim that he is
not responsible when outraged individual Muslims vent their anger on the
United States but that he can understand their actions and justify them.
The declaration’s most important part is a fatwa, or ruling:
To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque
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[in Jerusalem] and the Haram Mosque [in Mecca] are freed from their grip and until
their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, inca53
pable of threatening any Muslim.

This document is remarkable not because it constitutes a declaration of war
against America or because it makes no distinction between innocent civilians
and military personnel but because it transcends the bounds of fundamentalist
rhetoric and discourse. It reaches out to those in the Arab and Islamic worlds
who do not share the agenda or language of the Islamic fundamentalists.
The 28 September 2001 Interview and 8 October Speech. Indeed, even secular
Arabs and most nonfundamentalist Muslims view with mounting outrage
and despair what America has done to Iraq and its policies with respect to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is crucial for understanding why many people
in the Arab and Islamic worlds viewed the destruction of the World Trade
Center and the damage to the Pentagon with barely concealed glee, studied indifference, or awe.
In an interview on 28 September 2001, Bin Laden expressed his reactions to
the terror attacks and the fact that he was viewed as the chief culprit: “I have already said that I am not involved in the 11 September attacks, nor do I consider
the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable
act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other
54
people.”
This is very interesting. Bin Laden here seemed to have retreated from his
earlier claim that war against all Americans is permissible and that there is no
distinction between innocents and legitimate military targets. However, his retreat back into the mainstream of Islamic thought on just war—which calls for
such a distinction between innocent noncombatants and combatants—must be
considered a tactical ploy. Ultimately it clashes with his view, derived from
Farag, that jihad is more important than anything except belief in God. If that is
so, “collateral damage” sustained by innocents and noncombatants can hardly
be allowed to stand in the way. If jihad is a central pillar of Bin Laden’s thought,
his retreat on the issue of the killing of noncombatants was a pragmatic step designed to suit the realities of the situation at the time—that is, the need to avoid
American retaliation.
But American retaliation did come. On 8 October, U.S. forces launched a concerted air assault on what passes for infrastructure in Afghanistan. Following the
start of the American offensive against him, Bin Laden launched a verbal onslaught
against the United States and its allies in the Muslim world, whom Bin Laden
castigated as “hypocrites,” in an appearance that day on the controversial but
popular Arab satellite television station Al-Jazeera. His comments were significant
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in other ways as well. Bin Laden spoke apocalyptically of the possibility of a war
between Muslim and non-Muslim, of the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanctions and of the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. Contrary to the observations of some that Bin Laden has not been concerned with what happens in the
Fertile Crescent, this was not the first time he had spoken about these issues; however, it was the first time that they had attained such prominence in his strategy.
This indicates a decision to widen his base of support beyond those ideologically sympathetic to him. Indeed, Bin Laden’s speech of 8 October resonated
with a number of people in the region, many of whom expressed satisfaction
with that part of his message, if not with his methods or his apocalyptic vision of
55
a clash between Muslims and non-Muslims. Certainly, Bin Laden’s decision to
appear on TV after the American attack indicates a sophisticated understanding
56
of the power of the media.
WHERE IT IS, WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT DOES
What does this all mean? Are we witnessing the start of the clash of civilizations,
as predicted by Samuel Huntington, or is the struggle against Bin Laden primarily a military and law-enforcement campaign writ large—one that will eventually address other terrorist entities and state sponsors by the same means? Both
are losing strategies, and the United States cannot afford either of them.
The Western and Islamic worlds have many common attributes, but their
mutual history has been one of conflict and discord since medieval times. The
facts that they had more in common with each other than either had with, say,
the Sinic or Hindu civilizations and that they were adjacent to one another contributed enormously to the centuries of struggle. The evolution of Western
thought and ideas, and the emergence of Western military superiority from the
sixteenth century onward, opened a new chasm between the two worlds. Islamic
fundamentalists perceive two competing world orders, one man-made and materialistic, the other divine and spiritual. Each has claims to universalism: the adherents of each believe that its conceptions are universal and exportable—which
cannot be said about the Hindu, Buddhist, or Chinese civilizations.
It is not, however, in the interest of the West to view this as a clash of Western
and Muslim civilizations, for a number of reasons. First, it would play into Bin
Laden’s hands. He wants the United States and its Western allies to continue assaulting Muslim lands and peoples. This, he believes, would draw to him Muslims now sitting on the sidelines, and it might lead to the collapse of secularist
traditions and pro-Western tendencies within the Arab and Muslim worlds. It
would also galvanize his adherents and supporters to greater heights of zeal.
Second, adoption of the idea of a clash of civilizations would have major
implications for the domestic politics of Western societies. Europe has a large
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Muslim population, which is struggling within itself over identity, whether it
should exist as a quasi-separate community within a secular European society or
integrate itself into that society and do away with some of its older traditions. Islam is the second-largest religion in France; there are four million Arabs and
Muslims in that country. The United States has six million Muslims and three
57
million Arabs. A declared clash of civilizations would widen the gap between
these communities and the societies in which they live, with potentially dire
consequences for their political liberties and rights.
Third, the conception of world order promoted by Bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalists suffers from a fatal flaw that no thinker has been able to
overcome. Islamic fundamentalists
have been very good at highlight“Where was this false courage of yours when
the explosion in Beirut took place in 1983? . . . ing and analyzing the weakness,
And where was this courage of yours when two backwardness, and problems afflicting current Islamic societies.
explosions made you leave Aden in less than
They have also been good at protwenty-four hours!”
posing their own solutions—but
very bad at the details. They have no Islamic model to hold up as appropriate for
this day and age.58 The Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be a model, because it is
a Shia state, whose trajectory has been very different from those of its Arab
neighbors. Moreover, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s central political idea, the rule of
the religious jurisprudent, constituted an innovation even in Shia thought, and
it has been under constant challenge since his death in 1989. Sudan is not a
model either. It is a poor country, whose Islamic political system has not been
able to withstand the tensions between the army, under President Omar al
Bashir, and the Islamists, under the suave, Sorbonne-educated Hasan al-Turabi.
Usama Bin Laden and his followers, and many other Islamic fundamentalists as
well, can cause disorder and conflict with and among the West and its allies in
the Islamic world; indeed, they can widen the chasm between the two sides. But
it is not likely that they will be able to implement an alternative order that can
constitute a successful challenge.
On the other hand, a strategy that simply takes a military and law-and-order
approach, as advocated by some members of the Bush administration, is neither
feasible nor realpolitik. This is not a war that the United States can fight alone;
it needs a coalition, and its present coalition is wobbly. It would be adding fuel
to the fire to attack other terror networks—in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and
Iraq—particularly in the absence of direct evidence that other groups or states
were involved in the attacks of 11 September. Not even the European members
of the coalition who have been America’s staunchest supporters would be
willing to give the hawks within the Bush administration carte blanche. As for
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the countries of the region, they will see an enlargement of this struggle against
terrorism as an attack on Muslims and as an attempt by the United States, and its
ally Israel, to settle scores with all their enemies.
Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who might succeed him should he be killed over the course of the American onslaught. They
have been able to attack America effectively. The United States is a global power
with diplomatic, cultural, military, and economic interests worldwide. It is easy
to attack America by acts of terror against those global interests; Bin Laden has
done so in the past. But this time he brought the battle to the heart of the nation.
He and his supporters have crossed a threshold.
They have attacked the United States because of where it is, what it is, and
what it does. Of course, America is not attacked primarily for where it is—that is,
nearly everywhere, and conspicuously in the Middle East; its global presence
simply makes it easier to attack for the other two reasons. It is clear that America
is detested by many people the world over for what it is—a successful and dynamic modern society. It has created envy among the dispossessed and revulsion
among ideologically alienated groups who see it as totally antithetical to their
own values or aspirations. There may be very little that can be done to assuage
the anger of those who hate America for its very nature.
Some American analysts claim that terrorists hate America only for what it
59
is. This is undoubtedly true with respect to the terrorists themselves, but there
is a large number of people in the Middle East whose primary, if not sole, issue
60
with America is its allegedly unfair and “hypocritical” policies. Ignoring the
bubbling dissatisfaction with what the United States does, or allegedly does,
would relieve Americans of some painful policy adjustments that may in fact be
necessary. Many people in the Middle East see Bin Laden as sending the United
States a multifaceted message, elements of which they can identify with. Indeed,
Bin Laden has brilliantly established a nexus between those who hate the United
States for what it is—the great seductress, spreading a culture and religion of
material plenty around the globe—and those who despise it for what it does in
the Middle East, as they see it—extending support to Israel, turning its back on
the Palestinian quest for justice, continuing to punish Iraq for transgressions of
61
a decade ago.
While this article is not intended to make policy recommendations, it must
conclude by supporting, however superficially in a brief space, an alternative approach—a long-range and sustained strategy with a “basket” of many options,
some of which can be implemented in tandem, and others that would have to be
implemented sequentially.
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Instrumentally, the war against terror involves the use of intelligence assets
and military, legal, and financial means all at the same time, in a broad-based,
synergistic campaign. Despite recognition by the United States that terror constitutes one of its greatest security threats, the American war against terror has
not been an effective or integrated one. Psychological warfare and humanitarian
approaches are also required; to pursue them it is necessary to look carefully at
socioeconomic and structural conditions that contribute to the rise of radical
politics.
A number of failed states have become breeding grounds for terrorist organizations; Afghanistan and Somalia come to mind. Other states can be classified
as potential hotbeds—Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, and Algeria. Instead of focusing
on potential state sponsors of terrorism, it might be efficacious to look as well at
key states where conditions may ultimately promote the proliferation of terrorist infrastructures.62 A well-structured international economic-aid policy to
these countries could be formulated and implemented over a period of years.
Such a policy should address even such micro-issues as the so-called Islamic
schools (madrassahs) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where very young children
are indoctrinated into the belief that terrorism is just, that death in the service of
their version of religion should be their highest aspiration.
Policywise, the United States may have to make some painful adjustments
throughout the Mideast region. Although none should be implemented under
pressure of terrorism, some truly far-reaching changes should be examined. For
instance, must the United States permanently station ground forces on the Arabian Peninsula? If not, what does this mean for power projection and force
structure? Even trickier, how might America help resolve the debilitating
Arab-Israeli issue in a manner that both sides can view as fair, while making clear
to the Arabs that it will not abandon Israel as an ally? What can and should be
done about Iraq, which has become a point of contention for all Arabs, whether
fundamentalists, secularists, members of the working class, or intellectuals? It is
an issue that will not go away.
Last, but by no means least, the American tendency to ignore or brush over
the questionable stability of Arab allies and the deep-seated political and
socioeconomic problems besetting them works strongly against its own interests. How to persuade these countries that they must undertake reforms in
order to survive, however, is a nettlesome problem. Plainly, the strategy suggested here to combat the Bin Laden phenomenon needs to be explored in
greater analytical detail. In the final analysis, a comprehensive national—even
international—strategy, sustained over a long period of time, is needed to win
the war against terrorism. Any other way leads to the abyss.
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